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Abstract
In thinking about the ubiquity of algorithmic surveillance and the ways our presence in front of a camera has become
engaged with the algorithmic logics of testing and replicating, this project summons Walter Benjamin’s seminal piece
The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility with its three versions, which was published in the United
States under the editorial direction of Theodore Adorno. More specifically, it highlights two of the many ways in which the
first and second versions of Benjamin’s influential essay on technology and culture resonatewith questions of photography
and art in the context of facial recognition technologies and algorithmic culture more broadly. First, Benjamin provides a
critical lens for understanding the role of uniqueness and replication in a technocratic system. Second, he proposes an
analytical framework for thinking about our response to visual surveillance through notions of training and performing a
constructed identity—hence, being intentional about the ways we visually present ourselves. These two conceptual frame-
works help to articulate our unease with a technology that trains itself using our everyday digital images in order to create
unique identities that further aggregate into elaborate typologies and to think through a number of artistic responses
that have challenged the ubiquity of algorithmic surveillance. Taking on Benjamin’s conceptual apparatus and his call for
understanding the politics of art, I focus on two projects that powerfully critique algorithmic surveillance. Leo Selvaggio’s
URME (you are me) Personal Surveillance Identity Prosthetic offers a critical lens through the adoption of algorithmically
defined three-dimensional printed faces as performative prosthetics designed to be read and assessed by an algorithm.
Kate Crawford and Trevor Paglen’s project Training Humans is the first major exhibition to display a collection of pho-
tographs used to train an algorithm as well as the classificatory labels applied to them both by artificial intelligence and by
the freelance employees hired to sort through these images.
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1. Introduction
Today one’s face has come to replace one’s fingerprint
as the primary unit of identification. Currently, there
are over 30 companies across different sectors such as
banking, beauty brands, food and beverage brands, and
hotels that are developing and testing facial recognition
technologies (“Facial recognition,” 2019). Among them
is the retail giant Amazon which in 2018 unveiled its
affordable software for facial recognition Rekognition.
According to Amazon’s website:
Rekognition is an image recognition service that
detects objects, scenes, and faces; extracts text;
recognizes celebrities; and identifies inappropriate
content in images. It also allows you to search and
compare faces. Rekognition Image is based on the
same proven, highly scalable, deep learning technolo-
gy developed by Amazon’s computer vision scientists
to analyze billions of images daily for Prime Photos.
(Amazon, 2020a)
For under $10, now anyone can deploy this computer-
vision, deep learning AI driven tool to identify ‘targets’
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and ‘innocents’ based on photographs or video footage
(Amazon, 2020a). Rekognition has been deployed in
a variety of contexts. For example, the Oregon Police
Department uses the software to identify ‘persons of
interest’ (Fazzini, 2018); Aella Credit on the other hand
has deployed the software as means of identification of
potential borrowers in emerging markets while Daniel
Wellington relies on this technology to identify cus-
tomers who come to return items bought in their high-
end jewelry stores (Amazon, 2020b). The customer list
posted on Amazon’s website also boasts working with
the dating company Soul to “to detect objectionable
content before it’s posted while minimizing the need of
human involvement” andwith the children-oriented app
Go Girls, the photo service Sen Corporation, the sum-
mer camp platform CampSite. My point is that the use of
facial recognition software, be it Amazon’s or that devel-
oped by one of the other tech giants such as Google and
Facebook, has become a ubiquitous part of our everyday
life. It is used in digital and analog spaces to identify and
track all of us adults as well as our children.
The Rekognition software enables the recognition
of both loyal customers and those deemed undesirable.
Rendered through the Rekognition algorithm, the indi-
vidual becomes either a celebrity or a stalker; in other
words, either a legitimized public figure or a criminal-
ized private citizen. Rekognition is indeed being sold to
celebrities as a way to manage fans and stalkers and this
dichotomy is anchored in the public description of the
algorithm itself. In a sense then, algorithmic surveillance
is constantly categorizing the humans that it detects into
honorific and repressive categories. The repressive use
of the algorithm is particularly problematic because of
the perceived veracity and actual factual inaccuracy with
which it operates. Recently, Pasco County Sherriff’s office
deployed a biased algorithmic predictive system that
“generates lists of people it considers likely to break the
law, based on arrest histories, unspecified intelligence
and arbitrary decisions by police analysts” and then
sends deputies to interrogate the targeted individuals
(McGregory & Bedy, 2020). In verifying the criminal sta-
tus of individuals, facial recognition has also often proven
to be inaccurate; this inadequacy has been demonstrat-
ed by multiple studies and incidents. Notably, Robert
Julian-BorchakWilliamswas arrested based on a compar-
ison of two photographs taken by a surveillance camera
and his driver’s license (Allyn, 2020). The match was jus-
tified by an argument that algorithms are objective and
can identify criminals better than humans based on an
assessment of similarity between visual images. This was
one of few cases in which the “police admitted that facial
recognition technology, conducted by Michigan State
Police in a crime lab…prompted the arrest” (Allyn, 2020).
Algorithms are deployed in all aspects of our lives and
have come to guide biopolitical decisions on our behalf.
What is different here is the biopolitics of everyday life
are now entrusted in a technological system that is fur-
ther curtailing the role of humans as the decisionmakers.
Human agency, in other words, is relegated to the pro-
duction of ‘raw’material that is to be gathered, accessed,
categorized, and acted upon through algorithmic means
on behalf of technocratic corporations.
As their training base, facial recognition algorithms
often use ‘scraped’ consumer photographs (i.e., taken
from the Internet without notifying users) such as self-
ies and digital images aswell as state-issued photographs
such as those used on driver licenses. Consumer pho-
tographs posted on Amazon Prime Photos were used
without the explicit permission of the users who took
and uploaded them for the training of the Rekognition
algorithm. The Digital photographs became the basis for
algorithmic surveillance and as such, they permeated not
only the social media landscape but also the space of
algorithmic culture more broadly. As the windows to our
souls are reshaped into iris scans and the pictures of
our minds become faceprints, it is important to note not
only when and how these scans and prints are used to
assess the risk that one poses to society but also when
and how our eyes and faces became measurable win-
dows/pictures in the first place.
Algorithmic culture functions as a technological cul-
ture rather than simply as a digital media culture. Digital
culture has traditionally articulated to the ways in which
digital media has shaped culture, whereas in the context
of algorithmic culture, digital and algorithmic technolo-
gies well beyond media are shaping society. As I have
argued, “[I]n the context of an algorithmic culture, then,
it is increasingly important to understand the ways in
which algorithmic structures through recognition, calcu-
lation, automation, and prediction are shaping everyday
life” (Hristova, 2021, p. 3). The term technological cul-
ture, as coined by Jennifer Slack and GregoryWise (2015,
p. 9), broadly describes the ways:
Culture has always been technological, and technolo-
gies have always been cultural. Technologies are inte-
gral to culture and not separate from it….Human
culture has always existed in relation to what we
understand to be technologies: from voice, stone,
and fire, to clock, computer, and nanotechnology.
As such, the contemporary moment can be seen as the
orientation of a culture towards a new technology—
namely that of algorithmic technologies and should be
discussed in the context of technological culture along-
side notions of mediated culture. The term algorithmic
culture “draws attention to the reality that culture is
increasingly explained by, responsive to, and shaped
in and by the pervasive work of algorithms” (Slack &
Hristova, 2020, p. 18). Algorithmic culture thus accounts
for the ways in which this new form of digital technolo-
gy is changing all aspects of everyday life, not just our
engagement with media. The study of algorithmic cul-
ture then, as articulated through its technological and cul-
tural aspects, necessitates critical perspectives that grap-
ple with the nexus of new technological developments,
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politics, economics, and practices of resistance. Arguably,
the current moment is not the first time that we have
encountered the problem of pervasive surveillance cou-
pled with the proliferation of right-wing regimes world-
wide. Indeed, critical theory as articulated by Theodore
Adorno and Walter Benjamin emerged under a similar
historical context and is indeed quite relevant for address-
ing our contemporary predicaments. Benjamin’s work
offers important concepts that “differ from others in
they are completely useless for the purposes of fascism.
On the other hand, they are useful for the formulation of
revolutionary demands in the politics of art” (Benjamin
& Jennings, 2010). Moreover, Benjamin’s ruminations on
technology offer myriad concepts that help us untangle
the technological transformations in the context of the
increased presence of right-wing ideology and right-wing
authoritarian governments. For Benjamin, understand-
ing the ways in which visual apparatuses construe us and
actively training to perform a desired identity in the con-
text of technological surveillance holds the possibility of
technological disruption. In other words, being knowl-
edgeable of how technology frames us allows for a more
intentional presentation of the self, which in turn holds
the potential to render technologies themselves impo-
tent or useless to autocratic regimes of power.
In the context of algorithmic culture, surveillance has
becomean increasingly important topic (Benjamin, 2019;
Gates, 2011; Monahan, 2006; Noble, 2018; Pasquale,
2015). In exploring the ways in which our presence in
front of a camera has become engaged with the algo-
rithmic logics of testing and replicating, I summonWalter
Benjamin’s seminal piece The Work of Art in the Age of
Its Technological Reproducibility with its three versions,
which was published in the United States under the edi-
torial direction of Theodore Adorno (Benjamin, 2002,
2003; Benjamin & Jennings, 2010). The first version was
written in 1935, while the second version of the essay
from 1936 is a “revision and expansion…of the first ver-
sion…[and] represents the form in which Benjamin origi-
nally wished to see thework published” (Benjamin, 2002,
p. 122). The third and most popular in the United States
version, which Benjamin completed in 1939, was mod-
ified based on the editorial input of Adorno who facili-
tated the translation, publication, and popularization of
this work (Benjamin, 2003, p. 270). The third version
backtracks some of the celebratory stances awarded to
the notion of replication and reproducibility (that are
found in the first two versions) and bears clear traces of
Adorno’s fascination with the authentic as well as his dis-
dain formass art. It alsomoves away fromanunderstand-
ing of visual and visualization technologies and towards a
narrower articulation of visual media. In this essay, I high-
light two of the many ways in which the first and second
versions of Benjamin’s influential essay on technology
and culture resonate with questions of photography and
art in the context of facial recognition technologies and
algorithmic culture more broadly. First, Benjamin pro-
vides a critical lens for understanding the role of unique-
ness and replication in a technocratic system. Second, he
proposes an analytical framework for thinking about our
response to visual surveillance through notions of train-
ing and of performing a constructed identity—hence,
being intentional about the ways in which we visual-
ly present ourselves. These two conceptual frameworks
help to articulate our unease with a technology that
trains itself using our everyday digital images in order
to create unique database identities that further aggre-
gate into elaborate typologies and to think through a
number of artistic responses that have challenged the
ubiquity of algorithmic surveillance. Adapting Benjamin’s
conceptual apparatus and his call for understanding the
politics of art, I focus on two projects that powerfully
critique algorithmic surveillance. Leo Selvaggio’s URME
(you are me) Personal Surveillance Identity Prosthetic
offers a critical lens through the adoption of algorithmi-
cally defined three-dimensional printed faces as perfor-
mative prosthetics designed to be read and assessed by
an algorithm. Kate Crawford and Trevor Paglen’s project
Training Humans is the first major exhibition to display a
collection of photographs used to train an algorithm as
well as the classificatory labels applied to them both by
AI and by the freelance employees hired to sort through
these images.
2. Replication for Whom: Humanistic and
Technological Assemblages
Benjamin articulated his well-known concept of repro-
ducibility as operating on two different levels: One in
which “objects made by humans could always be copied
by humans and another in which the reproduction was
articulated through technology and thus became ‘tech-
nological reproduction”’ (Benjamin & Jennings, 2010,
p. 12). This second mode of reproducibility was articu-
lated through the emergence of the woodcut, became
amplified through the technology of lithography, and cul-
minated in the introduction of photography, which was
seen as a technology further displacing the human from
the process of reproduction by delegating the process
of “pictorial reproduction…to the eye alone” (Benjamin
& Jennings, 2010, p. 14). In this context, the eye fol-
lows the primary mediation of the original conducted by
the lens. In terms of algorithmic culture, the processes
of reproduction and detachment are further amplified
and dehumanized. Indeed, this dehumanization emerges
as a fundamental process that accompanies the move
away from the prehistoric connection between technol-
ogy and ritual towards a machine age driven by techno-
logical reproducibility.Writing prophetically in the 1930s,
Benjamin foresees the continued displacement of the
human and humanity towards technological autonomy.
In thinking about the distinction between ritual-based
and machine-based technologies, he wrote:
Whereas the former made the maximum possible
use of human beings, the latter reduces their use
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to the minimum. The achievement of the first tech-
nology [seen in a prehistoric context for example]
might be said to culminate in human sacrifice; those
of the second [rooted in the Machine age], in the
remote-controlled aircraft which needs no human
crew. The results of the first technology are valid
once and for all….The results of the second are whol-
ly provisional (it operates by means of experiments
and endlessly varied test procedures). (Benjamin,
2002, p. 107)
Under the auspice of photography, the process of repro-
duction became one that is exclusively visual and contin-
uously technological. The eye here is further displaced
as photography was seen as “bringing out aspects of the
original that are accessible only to the lens” (Benjamin
& Jennings, 2010, p. 14). Like the remote-controlled air-
craft without a human pilot, replication through pho-
tographic means is now directed not for the human
eye itself but rather it is distilled into a set of fea-
tures that are accessible only to the lens and the algo-
rithm: faces become faceprints, eyes become iris scans.
Trevor Paglen has theorized the emergence of images
in relation to machine learning and AI as “invisible
images” embedded in “machine-to machine seeing” in
which “digital images are machine-readable and do not
require a human in the analytic loop” (Paglen, 2019,
p. 24). Whereas for Benjamin visual film-based tech-
nology (photography and film) revealed optical uncon-
scious properties unattainable to “natural optics” such as
“enlargement or slow motion” but are ultimately made
perceptible to human vision (Benjamin, 2002, p. 102).
In the contemporary context, however, visual algorith-
mic technology reveals properties that are even less
unattainable by human perception as they articulate a
set of data points meaningful only to algorithms. For
example, an iris scan consists of at least 240 data points
and thus distills the world in a manner that is under-
stood by machine vision and machine knowing (learn-
ing). While the photograph captured faces, an algorithm-
driven camera now sees face models that are meaning-
less to human vision.
This translation of face-to-face model in the con-
text of facial recognition algorithms is evident in read-
ing Amazon Rekognition’s developer guide where a face
model becomes defined as a bounding box and fur-










Amazon’s surveillance software articulates personhood
first as the presence of a face and second through the
existence of posture. Furthermore, a face is conceived as
consisting of a left eye, a right eye, a nose, the right side
of one’smouth, and the left side of one’smouth. The face
thus becomes the locus of personhood in the context of
algorithmic surveillance (Amazon, n.d.). Through this pro-
cess of technologically reproducing people through visu-
al capture of either subjects or photographs of subjects,
the image is distilled into image-data. This distillation
obfuscates the relevance of the real, the original beyond
its datafied existence. Within the context of facial recog-
nition technology, this process informs the technological
articulation of both the input and output of the techno-
logical reproduction process.
Portraits, selfies, and photographs of people, in gen-
eral, are particularly susceptible to this transformation as
bodies in front of a camera are captured by its lens and
further translated into data for an algorithm. The end-
point of the camera is no longer a photograph. It is data.
The lens then produces not an image but a dataset. Facial
recognition algorithms use consumer photographs such
as selfies and digital images as well as state-issued pho-
tographs such as those used on driver licenses as their
training base. Once within the sphere of the algorithm,
the human body is relevant only as data and the image
itself becomes a useless intermediary. These data-points
are articulated in big data structures from which typolo-
gies emerge. Thus, the individual who stood in front
of the camera for a portrait or selfie, or simply walked
in front of a consumer or commercial camera is simply
understood in algorithmic terms, as an example of a larg-
er ‘measurable type’ (Cheney-Lippold, 2017).
In an algorithmic culture, the authentic individual is
replaced with an entity enthralled in a projected typol-
ogy in which common habitual traits are replicated and
reproduced. In other words, the uniqueness of individ-
uals or their aura is the main fuel of the algorithmic
machine. The machine relies on difference and differenti-
ation in order to trace unique database ids through time
and space. Benjamin’s critique on the insistence of hold-
ing on to the notion of authenticity, of customization, of
uniqueness is quite powerful. In an algorithmic culture,
if the original is already a replica without an aura, then
the process of technological reproduction is disempow-
ered. For the algorithm to work, individual behavior must
demonstrate patterns or ‘trends’ but it also much be dis-
tinct enough as to articulate a separate data point or big
data. In other words, individuation is useful to an algo-
rithm as it provides a point into a set of big data. Without
multiple individual points, there is no big data, and thus
the algorithmhas nothing toworkwith. The individuation
we are currently afforded is a superficial one—one that
is based on quantitative difference: We can buy a blue
case for our similar iPhone, or choose to purchase a pink
Rumba to clean our floors. We, however, are seen as stat-
ic unique entries that wear pink or blue (variation) but
remain constant and unique at the same time. Benjamin
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proposes an alternative framework in which individu-
als, not just art, might consider operating as consciously
reproducible entities without an aura. In a post-aura tech-
nological landscape, accepting a level of sameness on a
mass scale can defeat the big data impetus of algorithms
and thus render us useless to this technology. The level
of sameness here addresses the attempt of algorithms to
reconstruct us as digital selves, as unique digital identities
within group clusters. In a culture of corporate standard-
ization and surveillance capitalism, algorithms attempt
to reinstate algorithmic aura by defining the terms that
make us unique in a way that is inaccessible to us (Zuboff,
2019). What is authentic and what is replicable about our
own selves and our behavior is no longer a choice that we
as humans can make but is rather relegated to an algo-
rithmic calculation. Our algorithmic aura is neither com-
prehensible nor accessible to ourselves.
This theme of the non-original is visualized in
Leo Selvaggio’s project URME (you are me) Personal
Surveillance Identity Prosthetic in which he offered his
own face as a 3D printed mask in order to flood the
streets with Leos as far as facial recognition technolo-
gies are concerned. Selvaggio’s project mobilizes repro-
ducibility, reproduction, and replication as a political
tactic against the reappearance of the algorithmic aura
and its dominating uniqueness. With the prosthetic,
while the human eye is able to detect themask, the repli-
cation for the algorithmic eye is flawless and the algo-
rithm ‘sees’ a series of Leos. This distinction is impor-
tant. Masks traditionally have been seen as technologies
of resistance. As Zach Blas (2013) wrote, “The mask is
the most popular implementation of defacement, a cel-
ebration of refusal and transformation.” Masks are valu-
able defacement mechanisms in a human and algorith-
mic context. Selvaggio’s project both builds upon and
moves away frommasks as amechanism for defacement
and towards an exploration of masks as standardized
humanoid surfaces. His work is a prime example of an
artistic anti-surveillance camouflage practice that asks
individuals to explore the practice of algorithmic repro-
ducibility as an act of resistance. This project “involves
the design of masks that are eerie reproductions of his
own face, potentially spawning swarms of expressionless
doppelgangers moving through the street” (Monahan,
2015, p. 166). These masks were tested with Facebook’s
recognition systems and proven to trigger the detection
of Selvaggio’s face. Selvaggio’s narration of the project is
quite poignant:
I imagine a future where everyone wears my face, lit-
erally. Take a moment to consider this future. As you
walk down the street to the subway, you pass by me
over and over and over again. The sliding doors of
the train open to a swarm of Leos. (Selvaggio, 2015,
p. 165)
Thus, forgoing the process of individuation renders the
face when understood as face model useless.
3. Training for the Camera: Constructing Identities in
the Age of Machine Vision
Algorithms are trained on our images. This prima-
ry framework for training is precisely what Amazon’s
Recokgnition software deployed without the knowledge
of the Internet users whose faces were used for the
establishment of surveillance categorizations. If we are
to understand ourselves as constantly being subjected to
processes of surveillance and further replication through
the lens of algorithmic calculations, we must consider
the intentionality underlying the adapting of our every-
day behavior. We should consider training ourselves in
order to understand how the algorithmswork in order to
resist this new apparatus of surveillance. In an agewhere
technology is further displacing the idea of humanity
away fromauthenticity and towards replicabilitywith the
illusion of an algorithmic aura, Benjamin sees film as a
training ground for resistance through themedium’s abil-
ity to help us to understand the mechanism that guides
reproduction and learn how to be present for the tech-
nological apparatus. With regard to the potentiality of
film, Benjamin wrote that “the function of film is to train
human beings in the apperceptions and reactions need-
ed to deal with the vast apparatus whose role in their
lives is expanding almost daily” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 108).
His distinction between the stage actor and the film actor
is helpful here for understanding the new way in which
our replicas percolate in the algorithmic technological
landscape. For the film actor, the “original form, which is
the basis of the reproduction, is not carried out in front
of a randomly composed audience but before a group
of specialists” (Benjamin & Jennings, 2010, p. 22). This
process enables training with experts of the technolo-
gy and thus responding to the primary modality of algo-
rithms training on humans without the permission or
even knowledge of the ladder. As photography, film, and
social media bleed into algorithmic facial recognition sys-
tems, a similar call is being issued by prominent artists
today. For example, Paglen powerfully noted that:
The point here is that if we want to understand
the invisible world of machine-to-machine visual cul-
ture, we need to unlearn how to see like humans.
We need to learn how to see a parallel universe
composed of activations, keypoints, eigenfaces, fea-
ture transforms, classifiers and training sets. (Paglen,
2019, p. 27)
Understanding machine vision is crucial in order to be
able to train and perform identities suited to this new
technological landscape. Much like the actor, each of
one of us is encouraged to understand and intention-
ally train in front of the algorithmic apparatus. In the
context of film, or rather filming, the actor practices the
act until it is made perfect for the lens: a “single cry for
help, for example, can be recorded in several different
takes” (Benjamin & Jennings, 2010, p. 22). Thus, for the
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film actor, being in front of the camera for the film actor
is a “performance produced in a mechanized test” of a
premediated fictional role and an intentionally construct-
ed identity. Intentionality here is key because the film
actor is allowed to train with the help of experts whereas
workers are subjected to the same exact tests and judg-
ment but participate in them ‘unaware.’ Furthermore,
Benjamin warned that “the film actor performs not
in front of an audience but in front of an apparatus
[in which] the film director occupies directly the same
position as the examiner in an aptitude test” (Benjamin&
Jennings, 2010, p. 22). It is this awareness and intention-
ality that bring humanity back into the process as “for
the majority of city dwellers, throughout the workday in
offices and factories, have to relinquish their humanity
in the face of the apparatus” (Benjamin& Jennings, 2010,
p. 23). In a film test, it is only the performance of the char-
acter that is captured in this test, not the authenticity of
the actor.
Selvaggio’s project engages precisely with this inten-
tional performative model. He suggests that “when we
arewatchedwe are fundamentally changed.Weperform
rather than be” (Katz, 2014). Thus, this performance thus
is not an act of hiding, it is an act of modifying one’s per-
formance for the camera, much like an actor perform-
ing a character would. Selvaggio revealed the strategy
behind his project as one that “rather than hide a face,
substitute[s] it” (Selvaggio, 2015, p. 174). This substitu-
tion is articulated in the context of facial recognition tech-
nologies deployed precisely in relation to crime.
For Benjamin, the film apparatus provided a training
ground for the ways in which one’s mirror image became
replicated and distributed across networks. His observa-
tions could be translated to the context of digital pho-
tography and algorithmic surveillance, where the selfie
has become the mode par excellence of self-broadcast
to the world via social media networks and algorithmic
surveillance is seen as the most pervasive modality of
non-consensual capture and datafication of selfies, digi-
tal portraits, and street photography. The notion of being
aware of the ways in which the camera and the algo-
rithm translate our physical selves into reproducible data-
selves is crucial here. Being unaware of the surveillance
regimes in which we are embedded removes individual
agency. Thus, it is critical to understand how algorithmic
surveillanceworks and how one can test in front of it and
perfect a performance of an identity that is intention-
ally crafted to respond to the technological apparatus.
Unfortunately, we are asked to consider both conscious
and unconscious behavior at a micro-level. Consider the
millisecond you spend while scrolling on Facebook while
looking at sponsored content or the ways in which you
raise your eyebrows while reacting to digital content.
One implies an interest in a product and sells your poten-
tial consumer power. The other outright renders the con-
sumer into a product to be evaluated: If your eyes are too
close to your eyebrows your Body Mass Index becomes
elevated and your health score decreases. The more we
know about the metrics that are judging us the more we
can intentionally counter them.
The ubiquity of surveillance coupled with its invisibil-
ity or rather seamless blending with reality deeply res-
onates with Benjamin’s observation that “the apparatus-
free aspect of reality has…become artifice, and the vision
of unmediated reality the Blue Flower in the land of
technology” (Benjamin & Jennings, 2010, p. 28). A vision
of unmediated reality is thus seen as an inaccessible,
romanticized ideal as the Blue Flower represents “the
unattainable object of the romantic quest, the incarna-
tion of desire” (Hansen, 1987, p. 204). This does not
mean that one must surrender to the idea of techno-
logical mediation and should abolish efforts to challenge
the technological and political systems that drive media-
tion. Rather, Benjamin suggested, an open acknowledg-
ment of our predicament, an awareness of the way that
it ‘sees’ us, and an effort to mindfully attempt to craft
our presence.
Mitra Azar’s (2018) work on algorithmic facial images
is of particular relevance here. Azar has made a com-
pelling argument that “when a selfie becomes mediat-
ed by new tracking technologies for security system and
entrainment based on face-recognition algorithms, the
selfie becomes an ‘Algorithmic Facial Image”’ (Azar, 2018,
p. 27). In the appropriation of the photograph from selfie
to a facial image, Azar noticed an important change:
If in the early 2000s the selfie seemed to be charac-
terized by a certain degree of (calculated) spontane-
ity, an analogically constructed liveness and a form
of human agency, this new form of selfie is rather
defined by trackability, its algorithmically construct-
ed liveness, and its non-human agency. (Azar, 2018,
pp. 27–28)
In this transition, the camera itself becomes in the words
of Deleuze and Guattari a ‘faciality machine’ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987 p. 199). The algorithmicmachine that I am
referring to in this project is indeed a faciality machine.
What is notable here is the emergence of the selfie as a
particular type of performance for the camera facing us
rather than the world and the potentiality for the aug-
mentation of this act when the visualization technolo-
gy becomes understood as a faciality machine. In oth-
er words, we have already trained to perform a ‘selfie’
for the camera and are now in the moment of retrain-
ing once more—this time, in the context of algorith-
mic visuality.
Kate Crawford and Trevor Paglen’s project Training
Humans highlights precisely the ways in which self-
ies, portraits, and state-issued identification have been
harnessed in the training of facial recognition algo-
rithms without the knowledge of the people in these
photographs. Training Humans was “the first major pho-
tography exhibition devoted to training images: the col-
lections of photos used by scientists to train AI systems
how to ‘see’ and categorize the world” (Crawford &
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Paglen, 2020). As the authors note, they are reintro-
ducing into the gallery photographs that “aren’t really
meant for humans [as] they’re in collections designed
for machines” (Crawford & Paglen, 2019). Here Crawford
and Paglen exposed the inner workings of algorith-
mic classification and, in a sense, acted as the experts
who allowed audiences to understand and train for the
new algorithmicmachine. The exhibit provided historical
context about the ways in which anthropometrics and
biometrics have historically been deployed in the artic-
ulation of human typologies. They further displayed the
images used to create algorithmic classifications uncov-
ering the duality of the photograph as an honorific and
repressive entity. The most powerful part of this project
is the real-time visualization of the algorithmic decision-
making process as it evaluates the gender, age, and emo-
tion of the people it ‘sees’ (Crawford & Paglen, 2019).
According to Crawford, they:
Wanted to engage directly the images that train AI
systems, and to take those images seriously as a part
of a rapidly evolving culture. They represent the new
vernacular photography that drives machine vision.
To see how this works, [they] analyzed hundreds of
training sets to understand how these ‘engines of see-
ing’ operate. (Crawford & Paglen, 2020)
Furthermore, Crawford characterized this training pro-
cess as two-pronged: as everyday photographs train-
ing algorithms and as algorithms training humans how
to behave. Training Humans, alongside Crawford and
Paglen’s Excavating AI project, raises an important ques-
tion about the lack of awareness by the people in the
photographs about the ways in which their faces are har-
nessed for algorithmic testing. Unlike Benjamin’s actor
and much like his worker, those posing for a selfie or
a digital image were often unaware of the algorithmic
classificatory systems they helped shape and ultimately
became trapped by: “Harvesting images en masse from
image search engines like Google, ImageNet’s creators
appropriated people’s selfies and vacation photos with-
out their knowledge, and then labeled and repackaged
them as the underlying data for much of an entire field”
(Crawford & Paglen, n.d.). What Crawford and Paglen’s
projects reveal is not only how the actor or worker is
trained but also how the machine apparatus, the tech-
nology is ‘learning’ as well. In other words, the training
goes bothways. The training of AI requires “vast amounts
of data contained within datasets made up of many dis-
crete images” (Crawford & Paglen, n.d.). The training
of the human in front of the lens requires knowledge
and intentionality.
Alan Sekula has eloquently argued that photographs
have always participated in an honorific and repres-
sive systems of representation as the portrait and the
mugshot have been intimately connected since the
invention of photography (Sekula, 1986, p. 10). This con-
nection that as Sekula argues introduced “the panoptic
principle into daily life” (Sekula, 1986, p. 10) has been
further amplified in the context of AI where the num-
ber of images analyzed is well into the several hundred
million as seen by 2009’s ImageNet project (Deng et al.,
2009).While the scope of “scraped” images is impressive,
so is the extensive classificatory schema behind it. This
classificatory schema, developed through ‘crowdsourc-
ing’ on Amazon’s labor marketplace Mechanical Turk, is
then reflected back to the unsuspected users of the dig-
ital world. As Crawford and Paglen note, here not only
race, gender, and economic status are encoded to algo-
rithmic data and back as cultural identity, but so are val-
ue judgments about people:
As we go further into the depths of ImageNet’s
Person categories, the classifications of humans with-
in it take a sharp and dark turn. There are categories
for Bad Person, Call Girl, Drug Addict, Closet Queen,
Convict, Crazy, Failure….There are many racist slurs
and misogynistic terms. (Crawford & Paglen, n.d.)
The classification schemawas developed to aid the recog-
nition and sorting processes driven algorithms and ben-
efits the owners of the technological apparatuses and
not the humans who were ‘processed’ as training data.
In Training Humans, they further provide an extensive
genealogy specific to the ways in which algorithmic facial
recognition participates in narratives of human classi-
fication. As such this project is a direct extension of
what Sekula, as well as Crawford and Paglen, trace to
be a genealogy of eugenics rooted in the 19th centu-
ry phrenology and physiognomy work of Francis Galton,
Alphonse Bertillon, and Cesare Lombroso (Crawford &
Paglen, 2019, p. 21). The distillation of images into data
for the purposes of algorithmic capitalist surveillance is
yet the latest instance of the enmeshment of photogra-
phy with eugenics. Crawford and Paglen’s project exem-
plifies par excellence the claim that Lea Laura Michelsen
has aptly made, “Digital biometrics can be perceived as
a physiognomic renaissance” (Michelsen, 2018, p. 37).
Art projects that enable the public to see how they
are being judged by algorithms have been developed not
only for art galleries but also through digital platforms
with greater access. One example is Tijmen Schep’s How
Normal Am I interactive documentary project (Schep,
2020). In it, the audience is asked to turn on their camera
and is guided through a series of algorithmic decisions
while Schep narrates the inner workings of facial recog-
nition. He reveals the ways in which beauty is judged
on platforms such as Tinder, where people with simi-
lar scores are considered to be a match, and unpacks
how health insurance industries use facial recognition to
predict BMI indexes and thus assess health risk. In this
project, the audience is also given the opportunity to
train for the algorithm: “By giving access to your webcam
you can also experience how these AI systems rate your
own face” (Schep, 2020). The experience is coupled with
useful tips; for example, raising one’s eyebrow leads the
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algorithms to assume a greater BMI index and thus the
risk of obesity. Both Training Humans and How Normal
am I allow for subjects in front of the camera to test
their behavior and see the different outcomes live. They
are given tips on how to perform and then are allowed
to see if their behavior is gaged based on their expecta-
tions. The training in front of the camera is responsive
and guided by experts who understand the inner work-
ings of the algorithm. The training here begins in the con-
text of art and raises awareness about the ways in which
assessments are made about our conscious and uncon-
scious behavior.
Understanding and regulating the processes of data
gathering processes as well as algorithmic development
practices are crucial components for the development of
a more equitable algorithmic culture: A culture that asks
how apparatuses of assessment are created and indeed
can them move forward to challenge them and perhaps
call for their abolishment. While structural resistance is
absolutely vital, so is micro-level training on how we are
being judged by facial recognition platforms. Politicized
algorithmic art allows us to bring back intentionality and
awareness in front of the camera and to practice the
ways in which to carry and present ourselves in front
of this new capitalist surveillance assemblage in a safe
space. In other words, by engaging with projects that
are critical of facial recognition, we can start to under-
stand and adapt to the inner workings of this newmodal-
ity of technological reproduction and also challenge the
deployment of these technologies altogether. If we are
going to live in an increasingly algorithmic world, we
must adapt to it mindfully in the meantime and resist
the entrenchment of technocratic political orders in the
long term.
4. Disruptive Practices: Unleashing the Revolutionary
Potentials of Art and Performativity
The rise of AI and facial recognition surveillance has yet
again elicited questions about theways inwhich the algo-
rithms can be designed to be more accurate, less biased,
subjected to legal systems, decoupled fromauthoritarian
regimes, and last but not least individually resisted. For
Benjamin, technological reproduction offered an escape
from “enslavement” and this liberation was to come
“only when humanity’s whole constitution has adapted
itself to the new productive forces which the second
technology has set free” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 108). This
freedom to play once “liberated from drudgery” was
seen as possible only “when the collective makes this
technology it’s own” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 124). The dis-
course on technological liberation from chores for the
sake of convenience and play still resonates today in
discourses about how now computing and autonomous
technology are allowing more playtime. This celebratory
stance towards collective ownership of technology that
takes at its heart the rejection of authenticity and ritual
and the embrace of popular and replicable is challenged
by Theodor Adorno (n.d.) in a letter to Benjamin. Adorno
rightfully insisted on considering the larger economic
structure that makes mass art possible. In the contem-
porary context, visual technologies ranging from digital
photography to algorithmic surveillance are not democ-
ratized but rather lay in the hands of few corporations.
The reproducibility that they offer under the guise of play
is articulated in terms that are useful for the machines
themselves and the capitalist frameworks of alienation
in which they operate. On the other hand, Benjamin
sees the politics of art or further the politicizing of art
as a powerful antidote to authoritarian and exploitative
regimes (Benjamin & Jennings, 2010, pp. 12, 36).
The idea that art can be a powerful agent of change
has been challenged by critics of state and capitalism
surveillance. As Torin Monahan has aptly noted, in the
ageof increased surveillance, there has been a rise in anti-
surveillance camouflage in the form of artistic projects
and products centering on “masking of identity to under-
mine technological efforts to fix someone as unique
entity apart from the crowd” (Monahan, 2015, p. 159).
He has questioned the effectiveness of such projects:
Anti-surveillance camouflage of this sort flaunts the
system, ostensibly allowing wearers to hide in plain
sight—neither acquiescing to surveillance mandates
nor becoming reclusive under their withering gaze.
This is an aestheticization of resistance, a perfor-
mance that generates media attention and scholar-
ly interest without necessarily challenging the vio-
lent and discriminatory logics of surveillance soci-
eties. (Monahan, 2015, p. 160)
Monahan proceeded to situate this right to hide in rela-
tion to the surveillance practice of the state which has
embraced the right to look and denied the right to look
back. This position on the uselessness of art has been
countered by a strong justification of the role of surveil-
lance art in the larger cultural landscape. Monahan
insists on the importance of challenging the institutional,
economic, and legal systems in which algorithmic surveil-
lance operates, and rightly so. However, art offers yet
another track of resistance that does not assume the era-
sure of other oppositional positions, but rather amplifies
the struggle against these normative technological appa-
ratuses. As Elise Morrison has written:
Surveillance art, as a genre of political activism and
performance, combats the common tendency with-
in surveillance society to succumb to a kind of amne-
sia of convenience, an ambivalent state in which the
majority of user-consumers are willing to forget or
look past the risks of using surveillance technologies
in prescribed ways because of perceived economic,
political and social gains. (Morrison, 2015, p. 126)
The dialectic here is one that questions the role of the
arts in conversations about technology and culture. I side
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here with Morrison’s sentiment that art allows for a crit-
ical framework through which naturalized relations can
be brought back to a reflective practice. I think that the
greatest contribution to the artistic projects described
above is their contemplative nature or to come back
to Benjamin’s work—their intentionality in situating our-
selves in the position of the aware film actor rather than
the unaware mechanized worker.
Whereas artistic practice is already embedded in crit-
ical reflective practice, everyday posturing in front of the
digital mobile camera is hardly so. With regards to art,
Torin Monahan asked a poignant question: “By claim-
ing what can be framed as a ‘right to hide,’ instead of a
‘right to look,’ what, exactly, does anti-surveillance cam-
ouflage perform” (Monahan, 2015, p. 166). In thinking
about mass strategies for addressing algorithmic surveil-
lance, I want to address both the potential role of train-
ing to look back at the camera as well as training to hide
from the camera. Reflective posturing could be seen as
an example of resisting surveillance capitalism through
the paradigm of the right to hide. The activists have also
been deploying facial recognition as an apparatus rein-
stating the ‘right to look.’ Among them is Christopher
Howell who has turned the camera back to the Portland
police officers “since they are not identifying them-
selves to the public and are committing crimes” (Howell,
Strong, Ryan-Mosley, Cillekens, & Hao, 2020). Resistance
to the technological panopticon created by facial recogni-
tion algorithms must be multi-fold and multi-directional.
Through individual reflective practice based on aware-
ness of the assessment mechanism behind the camera
or through collective reflective action in turning the cam-
era onto the surveyors themselves, intentional visuality
might just be a power full for resisting the rise of both
the surveillance state as well as surveillance capitalism.
5. Conclusion
As we move between a digital media world in which
digital selves are articulated through algorithms for the
purposes of advertising to an algorithmic culture where
algorithms monitor and evaluate our conscious and
unconscious behavior through thousands of cameras
embedded in both public and private spaces, it is cru-
cial to continue to explore modes of critique and resis-
tance. Walter Benjamin’s first and second versions of
this famous essay The Work of Art in the Age of Its
Technological Reproducibility offer an important appara-
tus for challenging algorithmic surveillance. Benjamin’s
assessment of the role of reproduction on one hand and
training in front of the camera on the other offer impor-
tant insights into our contemporary conditions. His writ-
ing on art and film in the context of fascism is indeed
deeply relevant to an analysis of surveillance art in the
context of a global proliferation of right-wing authoritar-
ian regimes. Benjamin offers a powerful critique of the
ways the camera reproduces not just art but also human
behavior and one might say specters of the humans
themselves and in this process excises the original—be
it again the artwork or the human caught in the repro-
duction loop. One of the mechanisms for challenging
this technocratic framework that he offers is the empha-
sis on reflection and intention. This reflection process
entails an intentional reversal of the basic assumptions
that structure algorithmic technology and thus the intro-
duction of deflective methods of resistance. Some of
these deflective methods have been harnessed by con-
temporary artists as a critique of algorithmic culture. Just
as algorithms look for individual data points, artists chal-
lenge our algorithmic aura. Just as the algorithm trains
on humans, artists help humans in training for the algo-
rithm. Until we can dismantle the contemporary algorith-
mic panopticon, a game of hide and deflect might be
in order.
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